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Abstract—One challenge for building a secure network com-
munication environment is how to effectively detect and prevent
malicious network behaviours. The abnormal network activities
threaten users’ privacy and potentially damage the function and
infrastructure of the whole network. To address this problem,
the network intrusion detection system (NIDS) has been used.
By continuously monitoring network activities, the system can
timely identify attacks and prompt counter-attack actions. NIDS
has been evolving over years. The current-generation NIDS
incorporates machine learning (ML) as the core technology in
order to improve the detection performance on novel attacks.
However, the high detection rate achieved by a traditional ML-
based detection method is often accompanied by large false-
alarms, which greatly affects its overall performance. In this
paper, we propose a deep neural network, Pelican, that is built
upon specially-designed residual blocks. We evaluated Pelican
on two network traffic datasets, NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15.
Our experiments show that Pelican can achieve a high attack
detection performance while keeping a much low false alarm
rate when compared with a set of up-to-date machine learning
based designs.
Index Terms—Artificial Intelligence, Computational Intelli-
gence, Cyber Warfare, Machine Learning, Intrusion Detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the continuously expanding network scale, network
attacks are becoming more and more frequent, volatile and
advanced. From mobile phones, personal computers to in-
dustrial servers, all networked devices are potentially under
the threats of malicious intrusion activities. How to effec-
tively discover and prevent the intrusions is very challenging.
Many cybersecurity enterprises and research institutes, such
as Chronicle, Symantec, McAfee, have been developing the
network intrusion detection system (NIDS) to safeguard their
networked computing environments.
Fig. 1 shows a general setting of using such a detection
system, where NIDS sits within the network, continuously
monitors in-out network traffic, and reports any suspicious
behaviours to the security team for further attack identification
and containment.
The NIDS designs were initially signature-based and were
only effective for the detection of known attacks. With the
increasingly large traffic data generated each day and the need
to timely detect volatile and advanced attacks (due to growing
network users), the artificial intelligence (AI) or machine
learning (ML) technology has come into play in the NIDS
design.
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Fig. 1: Network Intrusion Detection with NIDS
Most of the existing ML-based NIDS designs, however,
achieve high detection rate at the cost of large false alarms,
which is inevitably adding unnecessary workload to the se-
curity team and may delay the counter-attack responses, and
hence adversely affecting the overall network security.
In this paper, we aim to develop a deep neural network
(DNN) design to achieve high intrusion detection accuracy.
Our main contributions are as follows:
• We investigate the performance degradation – the hurdle
existing in training DNN, and introduce residual learning
in our design.
• We propose a building-block based DNN structure, Peli-
can, that is built on sub residual networks.
• To improve learning efficiency, we incorporate CNN and
RNN in the sub residual network so that both spatial
and temporal features in the input data can be effectively
captured.
• We test Pelican on two different network traffic datasets
and compare Pelican with a set of ML based designs
for intrusion detection. Our experiment results show that
Pelican outperforms those existing designs.
• Importantly, our work demonstrates that the residual
learning is effective in building DNN for network intru-
sion detection.
The motivation of using residual learning and the brief
discussion of residual learning are given in the next two
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Fig. 2: Motivational Example: Performance Degradation in Training DNN for Network Intrusion Detection
sections (Section II and Section III). Our design for Pelican
with residual networks is presented in Section IV.
II. MOTIVATION
It is a general perspective that a deeper neural network
should have a better potential on learning and generalization
data than a shallow one. We tested this idea by running an
experiment based on an existing neural network design, LuNet,
which was proposed in [1] for network intrusion detection.
Fig. 2 shows the plots of training accuracy and testing accuracy
(on a dataset UNSW-NB15) of the network with respect to
different number of parameter (or learning) layers. From these
plots, we can see that as the network depth increases, the
learning accuracy does not increase as expected; Instead the
performance is even degraded.
In fact, this performance degradation in training deep
neural network is not just for network intrusion detection. The
problem was also revealed early in [2]–[4] when training the
convolution neural networks (CNN) for image classification.
The performance degradation issue imposes a great hurdle
in unleashing the potential of deep neural network. There have
been a few solutions proposed. Among them, residual learning
has been demonstrated an effective technique in the area of
image classification. Here we want to testify that it is also
effective for network intrusion detection.
The general design idea of residual learning is briefly
presented below. (The detailed discussions can be found in
an abundant literature, [2] etc.)
III. RESIDUAL LEARNING
Residual learning is related to deep neural network. A deep
neural network can be abstracted with multiple learning layers,
as demonstrated in Fig. 3 (a), where three learning layers are
used. Each layer in the network contains a set of connections
between its input and output, and has corresponding adaptive
parameters (typically connection weights).
Network training consists of rounds of rounds of learning
that basically includes forward mapping and backward tuning.
Forward Mapping: For each round of learning, the net-
work processes the input data layer by layer in a forward-
propagation fashion to generate an output mapping
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Fig. 3: (a) Plain Network (b) Residual Network
F (X,W ) : X → Y , where X and Y are, respectively, the
input and output vectors, and W , the total set of adaptive
parameters from all learning layers. The learning error dY
generated at the output is then used to train the network.
Backward Tuning: Basically, training a network is tuning
the adaptive parameters in each learning round to minimize the
learning error. There are several classes of training algorithms.
For DNNs with a large number of adaptive parameters, a gra-
dient descent optimization algorithm such as SGD, RMSprop,
ADAELTA, is often used.
With such an algorithm, the error dY is backward propa-
gated through each layer where each of the related parameters,
wi, wi ∈W , is adjusted based on its gradient gi, as shown in
the below formula:
wi = wi − ri ∗ gi, (1)
where ri is the step size of the tuning and can be determined by
the learning rate. We use W = B(dY,G) to denote this tuning
process in Fig. 3 (a), where G is the total set of gradients.
The gradient, gi, of wi is the product of a chain of partial
derivatives of local outputs along the backward chain from the
output layer to the current parameter layer related to wi, and
can be approximately denoted as
gi ≈
∏
wj . (2)
If those parameters are smaller than 1 (as often is the case),
the gradient tends to be vanished towards the initial learning
layers; Therefore, the parameters of the initial layers will not
get properly tuned in each training round. But the initial layers
directly learn the input data and their learning is often critical
in capturing the fundamental features of the input data and
plays an import role for the final learning outcome. On the
other hand, if those parameter are larger than 1, the gradient
will become exponentially large (namely, exploded); In this
case, the parameter tuning is too rough and may fail to make
any improvement in the training, and therefore, the learning
cannot converge.
Consequently, with more and more learning layers added,
this problem become more and more eminent, leading to
network learning performance decreased, as observed in our
experiment shown in Section II.
Use of residual learning can mitigate such a problem. Resid-
ual learning was first introduced in ResNet [2], a very deep
neural network with hundreds of learning layers, for computer
vision tasks. ResNet has demonstrated amazing results that are
even better than human performance for image recognition.
Residual learning applies a short cut between the output
layer to an input layer, as demonstrated in Fig. 3(b), so that
the output error can be propagated to the input layer through a
shorten route, hence avoiding the gradient vanishing/exploding
problem caused by the existing long propagation path.
Our design with residual learning for Pelican is given in the
next section.
IV. PELICAN
Pelican is basically constructed with a set of residual blocks,
where each residual block, ResBlk, is a sub residual network
that is formed based on a plain network block proposed in
[1], as is shown in Fig. 4(a). The plain network block uses
CNN and RNN and is able to learn both spatial and temporal
features from the input. The main functions of each type of
layer in the basic block are briefly summarized below.
1) Batch-Normalization (BN) [5]: BN reduces the internal
covariate shift during training by scaling weights to unit
norms. It is applied before Convolution and Recurrent
network (GRU) layers. BN helps fine-tune the learning
rate to accelerate network training.
2) Convolution [6]: The convolution operation in this layer
extracts the spatial features from the input data and
produces a feature map at the output. The convolution
operation is often followed by an activation function to
amplify distinctions between features generated by the
convolution. Here the rectified linear unit (ReLU) is used
as the activation function.
3) Maxpooling [7]: This layer selects most active neurons
based on the maximum probabilities in nearby features
to facilitate the next stage learning.
4) Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) [8], [9]: GRU is a
recurrent network that can extract the temporal features
of the input data through a recurrent process. Similar
to the convolution layer, an activation function and a
recurrent activation function are needed for GRU, for
which tanh and hard sigmoid are, respectively, used here.
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Fig. 4: (a) Plain Block (b) Residual Block
5) Reshape: Since the dimension of data changes during
learning, the reshape layer is used to keep the accordance
of data dimension.
6) Dropout [10]: This layer randomly drops out some
connections from the network to prevent the network
from overfitting. It must be noted that dropout is not
a sole solution to overfitting, which will be further
discussed in Section V-G.
With the functional layers presented above for the basic
plain block, we construct the residual network block (ResBlk),
as shown in Fig. 4(b), where the short cut is connected from
the BN output to facilitate the initialization of overall deep
network.
V. EVALUATION
The training environment used in our evaluation was based
on TensorFlow backend, Keras and scikit-learn packages on
a HP EliteDesk 800 G2 SFF Desktop with Intel (R) Core
(TM) i5-6500 CPU @ 3.20 GHz processor and 16.0 GB
RAM. The training was performed on two network intrusion
datasets: NSL-KDD [11] and UNSW-NB15 [12]. Both datasets
have removed a significant amount of redundant records from
the originally collected data to ensure the trustworthiness of
evaluation [13], [14]. The NSL-KDD dataset consists of 5
categories: Normal, DoS, U2R, R2L and Probe, and the attack
samples were collected based on a U.S air force network en-
vironment. The UNSW-NB15 dataset includes 10 categories:
Normal, DoS, Exploits, Generic, Shellcode, Reconnaissance,
Backdoors, Worms, Analysis and Fuzzers, and the attack
TABLE I: PARAMETER SETTING
Category UNSW-NB15 NSL-KDD
Filter size 196 121
Kernel size 10 10
Recurrent unit 196 121
Dropout rate 0.6 0.6
Epochs 100 50
Learning rate 0.01 0.01
Batch size 4000 4000
samples were collected from Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures1, Symantec2, Microsoft Security Bulletin3.
A. Data Preprocessing
There were 148,516 and 257,673 data records from NSL-
KDD and UNSW-NB15 used in the evaluation. Before train-
ing, we needed to preprocess the data, which consists of three
steps:
Step 1, Numerical Conversion: Since the neural network
could not recognize the textual notation, such as ‘tcp’, ‘private’
and ‘http’ in the raw data, we converted them into numerical
values. Here, we used the ‘get dummies’ function in Pandas
[15] for the conversion.
Step 2, Normalization: The data in the dataset may have
various distributions with different means and derivations,
which may make the neural network learning difficult. Hence,
we applied standardization to scale them with a mean of 0 and
a standard deviation of 1.
Step 3, Training/Testing Dataset Creation: To address
the problem of data deficiency [16], we used k-fold cross-
validation to ensure a good training-testing proportion. With
the k-fold validation, a dataset was split into k subsets, where
k-1 subsets were combined for training and the rest one was
used for testing. Here, we set k=10.
B. Evaluation Metric
We used three metrics to evaluate the performance: valida-
tion accuracy (ACC), detection rate (DR) and false-alarm rate
(FAR), as defined below.
ACC =
TP + TN
TP + TN + FP + FN
, (3)
DR =
TP
TP + FN
, (4)
FAR =
FP
FP + TN
, (5)
where TP and TN are, respectively, the number of attacks and
the number of normal traffic correctly classified; FP is the
number of actual normal records mis-classified as attacks, and
FN is the number of attacks incorrectly classified as normal
traffic.
1CVE: https://cve.mitre.org/
2BID: https://www.securityfocus.com
3MSD: https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/security-updates/securitybulletins
C. Tested DNN Models and Parameter Setting
To investigate the effectiveness of residual network, we
constructed two plain networks and two residual networks with
different depths. The brief description of the four networks is
given below:
• 21 parameter-layer plain network (Plain-21 ): It was
built with five plain blocks + one global average pooling
layer + one dense layer.
• 21 parameter-layer residual network (Residual-21): It
was built with five residual blocks + one global average
pooling layer + one dense layer.
• 41 parameter-layer plain network (Plain-41): It was
built with ten plain blocks + one global average pooling
layer + one dense layer.
• 41 parameter-layer residual network (Residual-41
(Pelican)): It was built with ten residual blocks + one
global average pooling layer + one dense layer.
The parameter settings of training those networks on the
two datasets are given in Table I. All networks were trained
with RMSprop gradient descent algorithm [17].
Since residual learning uses the “add” operation, the output
dimension of filters (number of filters) and recurrent units
must be equal to the input shape. In our experiment, after
the data preprocessing, the input to the network for UNSW-
NB15 has 196 features, and for NSL-KDD has 121 features.
Therefore, the input shapes for the two datasets are (1,196)
and (1,121) respectively. Hence, we set 196 filters and 196
recurrent units to learn UNSW-NB15, and similarly 121 filters
and 121 recurrent units to learn NSL-KDD.
D. Training Loss and Testing Loss
We recorded the training histories and compared the training
and testing losses to examine how residual learning can
mitigate the degradation problem in deep neural networks. The
training losses of the four networks on the two datasets are
plotted in Fig. 5 (a)-(d). As shown in Fig. 5, Plain-21 has less
losses than Plain-41, which indicates that adding more learning
layers leads to poorer performance. However, by using residual
learning, the losses reduce greatly; for the networks of the
same depth, the residual network has a much lower loss than
the plain network. It can also be observed that the deeper
network, Residual-41, in most cases, shows smaller losses than
the shallow one, Residual-21. The only exception happened
during testing the both residual networks on the UNSW-NB15
dataset, as shown in Fig. 5 (b), which could be explained due
to overfitting (More discussion on this will follow).
E. True Attacks Detected vs False Alarms
Table II presents the total number of correctly detected at-
tacks (TP) and the total number of false alarms (FP) generated
by the four networks on the two datasets. As can be seen from
the table, the residual-41 can detect more attacks and at the
same time generate less false alarms than other three designs.
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Fig. 5: A Comparison of Learning Performance of Four Tested Networks on UNSW-NB15 and NSL-KDD.
TABLE II: TOTAL TRUE ATTACKS DETECTED AND TOTAL
FALSE ALARMS
Dataset Plain-21 Residual-21 Plain-41 Residual-41
NSL-KDD
TP 14688 14702 14607 14732
FP 62 58 52 50
UNSW-NB15
TP 22094 22265 21211 22321
FP 220 136 399 121
TABLE III: TESTING PERFORMANCE ON NSL-KDD
Struture DR% ACC% FAR%
Plain-21 98.70 98.92 0.80
Plain-41 97.56 98.37 0.67
Residual-21 98.81 99.01 0.73
Residual-41 (Pelican) 99.13 99.21 0.65
F. Overall Performance
Table III and Table IV shows the detection rate (DR),
validation accuracy (ACC), and false alarm rate (FAR) of
the four networks tested on the NSL-KDD and UNSW-NB15
datasets, respectively. From the two tables, we can conclude
that:
• The residual networks outperform the plain networks with
a high detection rate, a good validation accuracy and a
low false alarm rate.
• With the increasing number of learning layers, a deeper
residual network can achieve better performance than a
TABLE IV: TESTING PERFORMANCE ON UNSW-NB15
Structure DR% ACC% FAR%
Plain-21 97.42 85.76 2.37
Plain-41 93.73 82.33 4.29
Residual-21 97.86 86.42 1.46
Residual-41 (Pelican) 97.75 86.64 1.30
shallow residual network.
G. Limitations on Experiments
Though our evaluation here has basically demonstrated
the effectiveness of using residual learning for deep neural
network for network intrusion detection, our experiment re-
sults are restricted by some limitations, and the training data
insufficiency and the low capacity of computing resources
are two major limiting factors we encountered, which are
discussed below.
1) Training Data Insufficiency: Generally, a deep neural
network requires sufficient data for it to learn effectively and
be able to cater for large scale data. Insufficient training data
may lead to overfitting, which can be partially addressed
by dropout, as has been mentioned in Section IV. In our
experiment, even though we already set a high dropout (0.6) to
overcome overfitting, it was still an issue, as manifested by our
experiment results shown in Fig. 5 (b). This situation indicates
that the deep network model needs more data to fit. However,
because of privacy and security concerns, a sufficient cyber-
attack dataset is much expensive to obtain. Currently, NSL-
KDD and UNSW-NB15 are only two trustworthy cyber-attack
datasets that are free of redundancy. We hope the training
datasets of sufficiently large will be available in future so that
Pelican can be further improved and evaluated.
2) Low Capacity of Computing Resources: Our Pelican
model can be easily scaled up with more learning layers.
However in our evaluation, we only managed to test on the
networks of up to 41-parameter layers due to the limited
computing resources we had. When we added more layers,
the training became extremely slow and laborious, which can
be improved with more powerful computing devices.
H. A Comparative Study
To further evaluate our Pelican DNN (of currently 41
layers), we compare it with a set of typical machine learning
based designs, as briefly described below, for network intru-
sion detection.
Support Vector Machine (SVM) [18]: SVM is a classical
machine learning approach that uses a kernel function, such
as Gaussian kernel (RBF), to learn high-dimensional data. But
as pointed out in [19], it has a low generation capability on
learning large scale data.
Adaptive Boosting (AdaBoost) [20]: It is an ensemble
learning approach that uses many cascaded weak classifiers
(such as decision trees) to construct a stronger classifier to
learn complex tasks. The advantage of using many weak
classifiers is its ability to mitigate the overfitting problem.
However, AdaBoost often does not work well on imbalanced
datasets.
Random Forest (RF) [21]: RF is also an ensemble learning
approach. But compared to AdaBoost, it uses a different
strategy of weight allocation. Apart from having ability to
reduce overfitting, RF can also handle imbalanced data. But
its generalization capability often relies on the specification of
features to be learned and for the effectiveness of learning, a
large number of features are required.
MultiLayer Perceptron (MLP) [22]: MLP is an early class
of feed-forward neural network that uses Back-Propagation to
learn non-linear problems.
Convolution Neural Network (CNN, or ConvNet) [23]:
CNN is the most popular deep neural network that has been
used for image recognition and has gained great successes.
With the help of convolution operation, CNN has an ability to
generate spatial representations from raw data.
Long Short Term Memory (LSTM) [24]: LSTM is a
recurrent neural network. By generating temporal represen-
tations from learning, LSTM has been successfully applied to
speech recognition and machine translation. LSTM is similar
to GRU we used in our residual block but LSTM has a higher
computing cost [25].
HAST-IDS [26]: It is a recently proposed intrusion detec-
tion system that uses a tandem CNN+LSTM model (first learn-
ing spatial representations by CNN, then learning temporal
representations by LSTM) as the core decision strategy.
LuNet [1]: It is also an CNN+LSTM based intrusion
detection system, similar to HAST-IDS. But LuNet uses a
TABLE V: A COMPARISON OF PELICAN’S PERFORMANCE
WITH CLASSICAL TECHNIQUES (BASED ON UNSW-NB15)
Design DR% ACC% FAR%
AdaBoost 91.13 73.19 22.11
SVM (RBF) 83.71 74.80 7.73
HAST-IDS 93.65 80.03 9.60
CNN 92.28 82.13 3.84
LSTM 92.76 82.40 3.63
MLP 96.74 84.00 3.66
RF 92.24 84.59 3.01
LuNet 97.43 85.35 2.89
Pelican 97.75 86.64 1.30
different architecture for effective learning of both spatial
and temporal features of the input data and shows a better
performance than HAST-IDS.
We trained each of those designs on UNSW-NB15 dataset.
Their detection rate (DR), accuracy (ACC) and false alarm
rate (FAR) are given in Table V.
As can be seen from the table, among all the designs
examined, Pelican shows the best performance - with the
highest detection rate and accuracy, and the lowest false alarm
rate - which further demonstrates the effectiveness of our
design with residual learning for network intrusion detection.
VI. BACKGROUND
In this section, we provide some background knowledge
related to network intrusion detection and then present our
two point of views for contemporary NIDS designs: 1) using
anomaly detection is not suitable for real time intrusion
detection for large scale network and 2) using supervised
learning is effective but challenging.
The idea of network intrusion detection systems (NIDS)
is proposed to improve the capability of security incidents
response [27], [28]. By monitoring the network activities,
NIDS can timely alert the suspicious and malicious network
behaviour to network administrators.
Security experts believe that most of new attacks are variants
of known attacks. The traditional NIDS designs prevent mali-
cious behaviours by using specific attack signatures from the
known attack libraries and have developed some successful
products, such as Snort [29] and Zeek-IDS [30]. However,
the signature-based solution lacks of intelligence to discover
advanced variants of previously known attacks. Hence, two al-
ternative strategies have been proposed to address the problem:
supervised learning and anomaly detection.
The principle of anomaly detection is that we only need
to learn a profile of normal traffic whereas the outliers are
considered as attacks. Statistical learning [31], [32], [32]–
[34] and unsupervised learning [35]–[37] are currently primary
techniques used for anomaly detection. The anomaly detection
for network intrusion detection is not very suitable and prac-
tical for the reasons below:
Reason one [38]: Anomaly detection often leads to a high
false alarm rate. However, a secure and dependable NIDS
system not only should have zero tolerance of attacks but also
should not block legitimate requests.
Reason two [39]: Even if we can reduce false alarm rate
by, for example, developing very sophisticated statistical or
learning algorithm, a current notation of normal profile may
not be fully representative in the future due to highly evolved
network. Therefore, anomaly detection may only work well in
a controlled network and may be less useful and practical in
most of commercial network environments.
In contrast to anomaly detection, supervised learning re-
quires a well-defined threat model to learn the underlying
distinctions between normal and abnormal behaviour (such
as Pelican and other classical supervised machine learning
techniques shown in Table V). Supervised learning often
produces a lower false alarm rate (FAR) and has more stable
performance than anomaly detection. Hence, it is currently
considered as a more reasonable and practical approach than
anomaly detection for network intrusion detection. However,
there are some challenges that need to be addressed.
Challenge one: Supervised learning requires a good and
continuously updated threat model to maintain its intelligence
for detecting more new attacks. However, due to the privacy
and information security concerns, network attack data are
often much expensive to collect.
Challenge two: Even if supervised learning can contain
FAR better than anomaly detection, the false alarm rate is still
not satisfactory enough compared to human experts. Hence,
more effective detection approaches are still required to further
reduce the false alarm rate.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the paper, we have examined the performance degradation
problem in deep neural networks and investigated how the
problem can be alleviated by using residual learning.
We presented a deep residual network, Pelican, for network
intrusion detection, and compared its performance with tradi-
tional plain networks and its shallower residual network.
Our work has shown that residual learning not only can be
used with CNN for image classification as has been demon-
strated in the literature, but also can be used with CNN+RNN
structures for network intrusion detection. Compared to a set
of state-of-the-art classical machine learning based techniques,
by using residual learning, the deep neural network, Pelican,
has a high capability for network intrusion detection.
It must be stressed that our evaluation is not thorough
due to the limitations we encountered (small training datasets
and lack of powerful computing facilities). A deeper Pelican
with more learning layers will be investigated in the future
when large training datasets and powerful computing resources
become available.
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